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The recent financial crisis emphasised the need for effective financial stability analyses and 
tools for detecting systemic risk. This paper looks at assessment of banking sector resil-
ience  through  stress  testing.  We  argue  such  analyses  are  valuable  even  in  emerging 
economies that suffer from limited data availability, short time series and structural breaks. 
We propose a top-down stress test methodology that employs relatively limited informa-
tion to overcome this data problem. Moreover, as credit growth in emerging economies 
tends to be rather volatile, we rely on dynamic approach projecting key balance sheet 
items. Application of our proposed stress test framework to the Russian banking sector re-
veals a high sensitivity of the capital adequacy ratio to the economic cycle that shows up in 
both of the two-year macroeconomic scenarios considered: a baseline and an adverse one. 
Both scenarios indicate the need for capital increase in the Russian banking sector. Fur-
thermore, given that Russia’s banking sector is small and fragmented relative to advanced 
economies, the loss of external financing can cause profound economic stress, especially 
for medium-sized and small enterprises. The Russian state has a low public debt-to-GDP 
ratio and plays decisive role in the banking sector. These factors allow sufficient fiscal 
space for recapitalisation of problematic banks under both of our proposed baseline and 
adverse scenarios. 
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1  Introduction 
 
The recent global financial turmoil emphasised the importance of stress tests in evaluating 
financial sector resilience to adverse macroeconomic shocks.
1 Typically, financial sector 
supervisors and central banks have carried out macro stress tests in cooperation with key 
financial institutions. Unlike the stress tests financial firms perform for their own internal 
risk management purposes, however, the objective of macro stress testing is to identify po-
tential sources of systemic risk and estimate the losses key financial institutions in a given 
country might suffer under adverse macroeconomic developments or various shocks. The 
recent crisis also demonstrated that stress testing can serve as an important macropruden-
tial tool for restoring confidence in financial systems, increasing transparency and reducing 
market uncertainty.
2 
Even if the adverse macroeconomic shocks of the recent global economic reces-
sion were largely generated in advanced economies, they strongly impacted emerging mar-
kets. The decaying macroeconomic environment was felt strongest in banking sectors of 
emerging economies with strong linkages to the international financial system. The fact, 
that emerging markets can be highly vulnerable to this kind of adverse macroeconomic de-
velopment  stems  from  the  much  higher  volatility  of  credit  growth  than  in  advanced 
economies. Thus, to properly assess potential banking sector vulnerabilities, stress tests 
should reflect the actual conditions of emerging markets if they are to serve as an effective 
information device. Moreover, an adverse scenario needs to be sufficiently severe to ex-
pose systemic fragility, yet remain plausible. The formulation of an appropriate scenario 
for stress testing is discussed in Berkowitz (2000), who argues for a probabilistic scenario 
structure and backtesting.  
Stress testing has been employed widely by regulators and private financial institu-
tions, yet no clear consensus on the applied methodology has arisen. Most currently ap-
plied techniques are based either on academic research (Blaschke et al., 2001; Jones et al., 
2004) or developed from practice-based guides published by central banks and interna-
tional organisations (IMF and World Bank, 2005; Čihák, 2007). 
                                                 
1 Well before the current crisis, Borio, Furne and Lowe (2001) point out the importance of stress tests in un-
derstanding risk and how risk relates to the economic cycle. 
2 See e.g. Bank of England (2008), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009a, 2009b), 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (2010) and European Banking Authority (2011). Zuzana Fungáčová and Petr Jakubík 
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Here, we employ a top-down approach to assess the resilience of the Russian 
banking sector to negative macroeconomic shocks. Our baseline and adverse macroeconomic 
scenarios are projected on individual bank balance sheets via simple econometric models that link 
non-performing loans and credit growth with selected macroeconomic indicators. We calculate 
credit, interest and contagion risks for both the baseline and adverse scenarios. Using this informa-
tion, we calculate the impact on bank capital for each bank, the sector as a whole, and groupings of 
banks broken down in terms of their size and ownership. 
Our study contributes to the current literature in two ways. First, we use a unique data 
sample based on the balance sheets of banks that hold a total of about 94% of banking sector assets. 
This is important because the stability of Russia’s bank-based financial system remains highly de-
pendent on bank health and the fact that the Russian economy is so big that its stability might affect 
financial stability in other countries. Second, our applied methodology reflects the recent trend to-
wards  dynamic  approaches.  We  employ  a  two-year  time  horizon  to  capture  the  deleverag-
ing/releveraging process driven by swings in lending (Jakubík and Schmieder, 2008; Schmieder, 
Puhr and Hasan, 2011). The impact of the deleveraging/releveraging process on the capital adequa-
cy ratios of banks, although commonly omitted in the literature, is crucial in assessing Russia as 
credit growth in emerging markets tends to be more volatile than in advanced economies. This is 
also reflected in the higher volatility of capital needs due to higher volatility of credit exposures. 
Admittedly, this emerging economy phenomenon to some extent reflects lower levels of financial 
intermediation and catching-up needs, but it can also stem from the aggravated boom/bust cycles 
typical of these economies.  
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of the Russian 
banking sector. Section 3 provides description of data sources and stress test methodology. Section 
4 presents and discusses our results. Conclusions are provided in Section 5. 
 
 
2  Main features of the Russian banking sector 
 
Despite the large number of banks operating in Russia (955 at the end of 2010) and signifi-
cant growth during the past decade (see Table 1), Russia’s banking sector remains small 
and underdeveloped compared to economies of similar size. Indeed, banking sector assets 
only correspond to about 75% of GDP and only 40% of Russians have a bank account. 
Moreover, banking sector assets are concentrated in the major banks; the five largest banks 
hold almost half of the sector’s total assets, and the 200 largest banks some 94%. Other 
banks are typically quite small, even if they might have regional significance. Growth in 
credit to companies and households contributed to increasing financial intermediation by BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/ 2012 
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banks in Russia during the past decade, but the ratio of domestic credit to GDP in Russia is 
still below 50% (over 100% in the Eurozone and China). 
 
Table 1  Development of the main banking sector indicators (annual growth rates, %) 
  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Total assets  27.3  36.6  44  44.1  39.2  5  14.9 
Capital (own funds)  16.2  31.2  36.3  57.8  42.7  21.2  2.4 
Corporate loans  38  31.3  39.8  51.5  34.3  0.3  12.1 
Household loans  116.4  96.2  78.3  57.8  35.2  -11  14.3 
Individual deposits  30.4  39.4  38  35.4  14.5  26.7  31.2 
Corporate deposits  36.9  43.7  52.6  47.2  24.4  8.9  16.4 
Source: Central Bank of Russia 
 
Unlike most countries in Central and Eastern Europe, no major bank privatisation occurred 
in Russia. Its banking sector remains predominantly state-controlled to this day. Sberbank 
and VTB, Russia’s two largest banks, held IPOs in 2007 that lifted the private sharehold-
ings in these banks to 40% and 23%, respectively. In October 2010, the Russian govern-
ment approved a programme to sell shares in numerous large state enterprises including 
banks over the next five years. In February 2011, VTB conducted a second public offering 
that resulting in the sale of a further 10% stake. Even so, the Russian state still owns about 
75% of VTB. Similarly, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), which currently holds a 57.6 % 
stake in Sberbank, plans to retain a 50%-plus-one-share majority in the giant bank even 
after selling 7.6% of its shares in the near future. Although referred to as a “privatisation 
programme,” the state will retain controlling voting shares in major banks and other “stra-
tegic” enterprises. 
Like in other economies, Russia saw state control increase during the recent fi-
nancial crisis. However, at the start of the crisis, state-controlled banks already accounted 
for over half of the Russian banking sector and all of the country’s five largest banks were 
state-controlled. These big banks acquired other banks during the crisis, further strengthen-
ing their market positions. Foreign participation in the Russian banking sector remains low, 
but has been increasing over the years. The number of banks with foreign ownership rose Zuzana Fungáčová and Petr Jakubík 
 
 Bank stress tests as an information device for emerging markets: 




  8 
from 174 in 2000 to 220 at the end of 2010. About half of these banks are majority foreign-
owned. Three of Russia’s “Top 10” banks are foreign-owned (see Table 2).
3 
 
Table 2  “Top 10” banks based on total assets and their market share (end of August 2011) 
Bank  % of total banking sector 
assets  Ownership 
Sberbank  27 %  State (CBR) 
Bank VTB  9.7 %  State 
Gazprombank  5.4 %  State (Gazprom) 
Rosselhozbank  3.7 %  State 
VTB-24  3 %  State 
Alfa-bank  2.5 %  Domestic Private 
Bank of Moscow  2.3 %  State* 
UniCredit Bank  2.3 %  Foreign 
Rosbank  1.7 %  Foreign 
Raiffeisenbank  1.6 %  Foreign 
 
Source: www.banki.ru 
Note: * through VTB  
 
Russia’s banking sector succumbed to the financial crisis in the second half of 2008. While 
banks were not directly exposed to the financial instruments that triggered the crisis, they 
and the rest of the Russian economy were hit with the double-whammy of reduced access 
to foreign financing and a severe drop in oil prices. 
The Russian government and CBR swiftly responded by implementing measures 
aimed at maintaining stability of the financial system. The emphasis was on liquidity sup-
port to the banks and maintaining stability of the ruble. The implemented measures in-
cluded a temporary decrease in bank reserve requirements, CBR guarantees for interbank 
lending to qualified banks, non-collateralised central bank loans, widening the range of ac-
ceptable collateral for Lombard and repurchase operations, as well as auctions allocating 
free budgetary funds to the banks. 
The deposit insurance framework was enhanced by increasing the deposit insur-
ance limit, and Russia’s deposit insurance agency assumed responsibility for restructuring 
individual troubled banks. Recapitalisation of banks was accomplished directly by the gov-
ernment in the form of capital support to state-controlled banks, or indirectly in the form of 
                                                 
3 Several foreign banks have recently decided to abandon their retail operations in Russia (Barclays, Banco 
Santander, HSBC). Moreover KBC is selling its stake in Absolut Bank and Rabobank plans to concentrate on 
other countries. Last year Morgan Stanley sold its local mortgage unit and Swedbank decided to curtail its 
operations as well. On the other hand, China Construction Bank has decided to enter the Russian market. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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unsecured subordinated loans from the CBR and development bank Vneshekonombank 
(VEB). In theory, both state-controlled and private banks had access to these subordinated 
loans, but the level of reliance on these loans depended on bank ownership. Private banks 
were recapitalised largely from other sources, while most of the capital increase of state-
controlled banks was supplied in the form of subordinated loans. VEB was also given re-
sources to help refinance foreign debt of Russian firms. These measures helped stabilise 
Russia’s banking system and boosted the state’s presence in banking as the government 
took over troubled banks via state-controlled firms or banks to preserve trust in the banking 
sector and avert bank runs. 
 
 
3  Data and methodology 
 
The state’s extensive participation in the Russian banking sector has strong implications 
for the risk assessment for the sector. As borne out by the recent financial crisis, the Rus-
sian state has the will and resources to bail out troubled banks. Russia’s interbank market, 
on the other hand, remains underdeveloped and dominated by the biggest banks. Most 
banks were shut out of the interbank market during the crisis, highlighting the lack of mu-
tual trust in the banking community. Moreover, as most transactions are overnight, liquid-
ity risk can be quite significant in Russian conditions, especially for smaller banks. 
 
 
3.1  Data 
 
To assess risks in the Russian banking sector more rigorously, we conduct a top-down 
macro stress test analysis. Unlike the bottom-up approach, the same models and assump-
tions are applied to all banks in our estimations.
4 Analysis is based on the balance sheet 
data of Russian banks as of end-2009. The 200 largest banks, which together hold about 
94% of the Russian banking sector assets, are included in the analysis to assess banking 
sector vulnerabilities over a two-year horizon, i.e. we provide projections for 2010 and 
2011. Our data come from the financial information agency Interfax, which collects and 
organises bank data from the CBR. Aggregate indicators covering the development of the 
                                                 
4 Some central banks use a combined top-down/bottom-up approach, e.g. the Dutch central bank (see Van 
den End, Hoeberichts and Tabbae, 2006). Zuzana Fungáčová and Petr Jakubík 
 
 Bank stress tests as an information device for emerging markets: 




  10 
Russian banking sector originate from the CBR and at the time of writing were available 
for 2010. Data describing the macroeconomic environment are taken from Rosstat. 
 
 
3.2  Methodology 
 
Our methodology links bank balance sheet data and the macroeconomic environment un-
der different scenarios. Adverse macroeconomic shocks are translated into capital ade-
quacy ratios to assess financial sector resilience. Risks on bank balance sheets (credit, 
market, contagion and income risks) are consistently covered within a single framework. 
Drehmann, Sorensen and Stringa (2008), who point out the importance of off-balance sheet 
items as a potential source of risk, saw their assertion recently confirmed by the global fi-
nancial  crisis.  Since  these  items  are  insignificant  in  the  case  of  Russian  bank  balance 
sheets, however, we do not include them in our analysis. 
We conduct the investigation in a dynamic framework in line with recent litera-
ture (Schmieder, Puhr and Hasan, 2011). For each item of assets, liabilities, income and 
expenditure, there is an initial (i.e. last actually known) stock, to which the impact of the 
shock in one year is added. This final stock is then used as the initial stock for the follow-
ing year. The changes in flow and stock variables are modelled in a consistent manner. 
Thus, losses reflected in a fall of profit (a flow indicator) will also be reflected in the same 
amount in total assets (a stock indicator). The dynamic nature of the analysis provides 
more realistic insights into banking sector vulnerabilities than sensitivity analyses or the 
commonly used static stress tests (Cihak, 2007).  
 
Our stress test analysis is performed in five steps: 
(i)  Creation of macroeconomic scenarios 
(ii)  Forecasting stress parameters by “satellite” models 
(iii)  Deduction of losses from bank capital 
(iv)  Iterative interbank contagion 
(v)  Computation of post-shock and post-contagion capital adequacy ratios. 
  
In step one, we create two macroeconomic scenarios for 2010-11. These are generated on 
the basis of publicly available professional consensus forecasts (baseline scenario) and ex-
pert judgement (adverse scenario). The scenarios include real GDP, inflation, the exchange BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/ 2012 
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rate between the Russian ruble and the US dollar and short-term interest rate.
5 These vari-
ables are then used to project housing prices and the development of key credit variables, 
including nonperforming loans (NPLs) and total loans.  
In the next step, econometric models for aggregate data linking NPL ratio growth, 
total banking loans growth and housing prices to past GDP growth and other lagged eco-
nomic and financial variables are employed to forecast credit growth, nonperforming loan 
ratio growth and growth rate of housing prices for the baseline and the adverse scenario. 
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where the lag structure is determined by statistical significance and X,Y and Z are vectors 
of other control variables such as nominal GDP, the NPL ratio, housing prices and house-
hold credit growth. 
These “satellite” models help us project credit growth and the NPL ratios for both 
the household (index h) and corporate (index c) sector consistently with the considered 
macroeconomic scenarios. The same growth rates are applied to all banks in the analysis. 
In the third step, we use our projected values and balance sheet data to calculate 
credit and market risks (including both foreign-exchange and interest-rate risks) for each 
bank over the two-year horizon. The value of risks is then deducted from total bank capital. 
Market risk is evaluated based on the changes in interest rates and exchange rates. 
With respect to interest-rate risk, we consider changes in present values of investment se-
curities available for sale (trading book), in particular corporate, foreign government, fed-
eral and municipal bonds. Their present value is influenced by changes in short-term inter-
est rates that originate from the macroeconomic scenario under consideration. Again, the 
parallel move in the yield curve is assumed. As data on duration are not available at the 
level of individual banks, we estimate average duration for available securities on the Rus-
sian market. We split securities into corporate bonds, federal loans, municipal bonds and 
foreign government bonds. Based on CBR (2010) data for the sector, the same durations 
are assumed for all banks (1.7 for corporate bonds, 4.3 for federal loan and municipal 
                                                 
5 The parallel shift of the yield curve is assumed for simplification in further calculations. Zuzana Fungáčová and Petr Jakubík 
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bonds and 1 for foreign government bonds). Finally, the sum of the changes in values for 
all mentioned segments based on standard Macaulay duration is calculated for the interest-
rate risk of every bank. Exchange-rate risk for each bank is calculated as the product of the 
net-open foreign exchange position and the change in the exchange rate resulting from the 
macroeconomic scenario under consideration. Hedging against foreign exchange risk is not 
taken into account (as this information is not available) so that foreign exchange risk might 
be overestimated in some cases. The same caveats also apply to the interest-rate risk calcu-
lation. 
Credit risk is traditionally the key risk for banks. This is particularly true for the 
Russian banking sector, which is mainly involved in commercial banking. The Russian 
economy was strongly affected by the crisis and experienced a sharp fall in economic out-
put in 2009. As a result, NPLs in the local banking sector rose considerably. This increase 
in credit risk took place against the backdrop of a pronounced local boom-bust cycle. An-
nual credit expansion rates exceeded 40% before the crisis, collapsed to -2.5% during the 
crisis in 2009, and then rebounded to over 12% growth in 2010. Credit risk built up during 
the boom period in which lending standards were lowered materialised during the bust pe-
riod when credit growth collapsed, leading with some time lag to a sharp rise in nonper-
forming loans. This is in line with the evidence from other countries. For example, Jiménez 
and Saurina (2006) look at the Spanish data and show that credit granted during “good 
times” has a greater likelihood of ending up in default than loans made during recessions. 
Due to the crucial impact of credit risk on bank balance sheets, macroeconomic 
credit-risk modelling often links credit risk and macroeconomic environment. Some re-
searchers highlight the nonlinear relationship between macroeconomic shocks and credit 
risk (e.g. Cihak, 2007; Jakubík, 2007). Moreover, the non-linear logistic function originally 
introduced in credit-risk modelling by Wilson (1997a, 1997b) is often employed in credit-
risk modelling.
6 If appropriate data is available, probability of default can be modelled di-
rectly (Hamerle, Liebig and Scheule, 2004). However, this information is rarely available, 
so NPL data are employed in credit-risk modelling. This is also the case here. 
For the analysis, we calculate credit risk for each bank, distinguishing between 
corporate and household loan portfolios. Expected credit losses are calculated as the prod-
uct of the average probability of default (PD) for the loan portfolio, the exposure at default 
                                                 
6 See Boss et al. (2006), Boss et al. (2009), Virolainen (2004) and Jokivuolle, Virolainen and Vahamaa 
(2008) among others. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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(EAD) and the loss given default (LGD). Due to the lack of LGD data for individual banks, 
we use the sector averages for corporate, household and other exposures (59% for corpo-
rate exposures, 55% for households and 58% for others) based on estimation performed by 
rating agencies as initial values for 2009.
7 The LGD projection uses a simple econometric 
model for housing prices. The exposure at default can be expressed as the difference be-
tween outstanding loans and NPLs. Projected NPLs depend on new NPLs (determined by 
PD estimates), outflows (as write-offs or selling-out of existing NPLs) and the current 
stock of NPLs. This is expressed formally as:  
 
    t t t t t t NPL r NPL Loans PD NPL NPL        ) ( 1 ,    (4) 
 
where r represents the average write-off (or sell-out) rate of existing NPLs. In practice, this 
parameter can be unstable over time. For instance, in times of crisis, banks may increase 
the pace of write-offs to clean up their portfolios. This parameter is hard to model, so we 
set a constant value based on common practices in the Russian banking sector and anecdo-
tal evidence. We employ the value 10% for corporate and other exposures, and 20% for 
household exposures.
8  
The estimated regression models for growth in the NPL ratio (gnpl) and credit 
growth (gLoans) are then used to indirectly derive the probability of default for loans to 
corporations and households separately. The growth of the NPL ratio can be expressed by 







































The expected probability of default (PD) is derived from the NPL ratio and credit growth 
projections. Probability of default is calculated as: 
                                                 
7 Moody’s Global Banking report for Russia was used for calibration - see Moody’s (2010).  
8 These numbers imply that banks on average keep bad loans on their balance sheets for ten years in the case 
of corporate and other exposures, and five years in case of household exposures, before they write off or sell 
them.  Zuzana Fungáčová and Petr Jakubík 
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t t t npl r gNPL PD ) ( 1    .          (6) 
 
Equation (6) suggests that the portfolio-average PD depends on the average write-off rate 
(r), the initial level of the NPL ratio and the growth rate of NPLs, calculated as: 
 
1 ) 1 )( 1 (     t t t gLoans gnpl gNPL        (7) 
 
To account for unexpected losses, we use the Basel II formula as it considers changes in 
risk-weighted  assets  (RWA).  This  allows  us  to  project  RWA  so  that  the  deleverag-
ing/releveraging effects that characterise the high volatility of Russian credit growth can be 
taken into account by satellite models for credit growth.
9 RWA change also affects bank 
risk profile.  
For the calculation of credit risk, we assume all banks behave as if they were 
complying with the Basel II framework, even if it is not fully implemented in Russia. 
Hence, the loan portfolio is split into corporate loans, retail loans and other loans. Credit 
risk is computed using separate formulas as indicated in the Basel II framework. For the 
capital requirement for corporate loans, we proceed as follows: 
 
Correlation (R) = 0.12 × (1 – EXP(-50 × PD)) / (1 – EXP(-50)) + 0.24 × [1 – (1 – EXP(-50 × 
PD))/(1 – EXP(-50))]          (8) 
 
Maturity adjustment (b) = (0.11852 – 0.05478 × ln (PD))^2     (9) 
 
Capital requirement (K) = [LGD × N [(1 - R)^-0.5 × G (PD) + (R / (1 - R))^0.5 × G (0.999)] – PD 
x LGD] x (1 - 1.5 x b)^ (-1) × (1 + (M – 2.5) × b)                (10) 
 
In the case of capital requirement for retail loans, we use the following: 
 
Correlation (R) = 0.03 × (1 – EXP (-35 × PD)) / (1 – EXP (-35)) + 0.16 × [1 - (1 - EXP(-35 × 
PD))/(1 - EXP(-35))]          (11) 
 
Capital requirement (K) = LGD × N[(1 - R)^-0.5 × G(PD) + (R / (1 - R))^0.5 × G (0.999)] – PD × 
LGD ,            (12) 
 
                                                 
9 This approach is in line with Schmieder et al. (2011). It was previously also applied by Jakubík, Schmieder 
(2008).  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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where N denotes normal distribution function and G inverse normal distribution function. 
For “other loans,” the same formula as for corporate loans is applied. The capital require-
ment for market and operational risk are assumed to grow at the same rate as the capital 
requirement for credit risk. 
Expected losses are calculated separately for credit and market risk, and then de-
ducted from total capital. Unexpected losses are covered by the Basel II formula so as to 
take into account the change in risk-weighted assets:  
 
Expected losses (EL) = EAD * PD * LGD          (13) 
Risk-weighted assets (RWA) = K x (1/MCAR) x EAD,      (14) 
 
where EAD denotes exposure at default and MCAR is the minimum capital adequacy ratio 
(10% for Russia). 
Losses stemming from the described credit and market risk calculations can to 
some extent be covered by available net income. Therefore, bank income is taken into ac-
count as the first line of defence against the losses. In particular, it is assumed that banks 
will use all available income to sustain their capital adequacy ratio at the same level when 
hit by a financial shock. If income is insufficient to fully absorb the losses emerging in the 
macroeconomic scenario under consideration, the losses are deducted from bank capital. 
Net income is computed as a sum of net interest income and non-interest income. The 
change in interest rate based on considered scenario and average net-interest income over 
last three years is considered to project the total net-interest income. Non-interest income is 
projected as an average over last three years. 
In the fourth step of our analysis, we take into account possible interbank conta-
gion. After losses are deducted from bank capital, a mapping of capital ratios into the 
probability of default of the respective bank (bank-specific PD) is used to determine the 
likelihood of the bank under consideration defaulting on its interbank liabilities to other 
banks. To consider interactive rounds of interbank contagion, we approximate bilateral in-
terbank exposures, which are unavailable, using the maximum entropy principle proposed 
by Upper and Worms (2002). Losses are computed using the default on interbank liabili-
ties. Approximated bilateral interbank exposures are then multiplied by a bank-specific PD 
derived from an expert-based mapping (see Table 3 below) of post-shock capital adequacy 
ratios into PDs. The LGD on a bank default is assumed to be 10%. Zuzana Fungáčová and Petr Jakubík 
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The resulting losses are deducted from the capital of the affected banks. Ten iterations of 
such interbank contagion rounds are taken into account. 
In the last step of our analysis, post-shock and post-contagion CARs that take into 
account the shock and interbank contagion are computed as average of the banking sector 
and bank-by-bank capital adequacy ratios. Possible recapitalisation costs that would arise if 
the  capital  adequacy  ratio  of  a  bank  falls  below  the  minimum  regulatory  requirement 
(10%) are computed as a proportion of GDP. Recapitalisation for the top 200 banks is 
scaled up to reflect their share of total banking sector assets. 
 
 
4  Empirical analyses 
 
In this section, we present the results for the banking sector as a whole and the results for 
banks categorised on the basis of ownership and size. 
 
4.1  Results for the banking sector overall  
 
The results of stress test analysis suggest that the Russian banking sector is quite sensitive 
to changes in the macroeconomic environment. High credit risk and cyclicality typical of 
emerging  markets  combined  with  the  low  level  of  financial  intermediation  appear  to 
dampen economic development under our baseline scenario. While this likely reflects the 
low level of financial intermediation and catching-up needs of Russia, it also is an indica-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/ 2012 
 
 
  17 
tion of aggravated boom/bust cycles. The CAR improvements in the Russian banking sec-
tor seen during 2009 and 2010 seem to be largely driven by deleveraging. 
 
 




Credit growth for both scenarios 
(%, year-on-year) 
Note: An increase in the nominal exchange rate index means depreciation.
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Sources: Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition and ECB calculations. 
Notes: Capital adequacy and non-performing loan ratios refer to the average (solid lines) and the 10
th and 90
th 
quantile (dashed lines) for the 200 largest banks by total assets.  
 
 
Banks on average appeared to be adequately capitalised at the end of 2010. The macroeco-
nomic recovery that started in 2010 continues in 2011 under the baseline scenario. This is 
reflected in an acceleration of credit growth that, after the decline during the crisis, turns 
positive in 2010. The rate of credit growth is predicted to more than double in 2011, which 
might constitute a threat for certain banks. Even if the NPL stock stabilises, certain banks 
might not be able to bear an acceleration in credit growth that puts downward pressure on 
their capital adequacy ratios. Based on our calculations and provided that banks are unable 
to raise additional capital from other sources, the CAR for 67 banks out of 200 included in 
our sample would fall below the regulatory minimum of 10% in 2011 and the total recapi-
talisation costs would reach 0.6% GDP in 2011. On the other hand, profitability of the 
banking sector in 2010 outpaced even pre-crisis levels, which would help improve the Zuzana Fungáčová and Petr Jakubík 
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situation of some banks in 2011. Moreover, state-controlled banks could be recapitalised 
easily by the government and state support for domestic private banks could also be pro-
vided via state-controlled companies as in 2008 and 2009. In addition, some banks will 
have to increase their registered capital anyway when new minimum capital requirements 
of RUB 180 million (about €4.6 million) enter into force at the beginning of 2012.
10 
Under our adverse scenario, which assumes only sluggish growth in 2011, the 
situation deteriorates further. As the macro data for 2010 and much of 2011 are already 
known, it is clear that this scenario is only hypothetical. The NPL ratio increases under the 
scenario to about 13%, while the average CAR for all banks included in our analysis re-
mains above the regulatory minimum.
11 Some 80 banks out of the 200 in our sample would 
need recapitalisation in 2011.
12 Total recapitalisation costs during 2011 would reach as 
high as 0.8% of GDP.
  
Taking into consideration Russia’s low public debt-to-GDP ratio (just below 10% 
at the end of 2010), the government is fully able to recapitalise banks under each scenario 
without facing significant fiscal strains. Despite this, our analysis highlights some weak-
nesses in the Russian banking sector. The currently large average capital buffer (18.1% at 
the end of 2010) was partly the result of a substantial slowdown in credit growth (from 
over 40% of annual nominal credit growth in pre-crisis period to decrease of about 2.5% in 
2009). As the economy recovers, high credit growth can put downward pressure on the 
CAR  from  the increase in  risk-weighted assets and banks tightening credit conditions. 
Thus, economic recovery could be dampened as access to external financing worsens, es-
pecially for medium-sized and small firms. Here, the capacity of the Russian banking sec-
tor to maintain pre-crisis credit growth without generating additional risk would be limited. 
This reinforces the views that Russia’s banking sector is under-dimensioned for the size of 
the economy and that private sector actors still face serious constraints in access to bank 
financing. Even today, Russian corporations tend to rely on financing obtained from global 
markets if they can get it. 
 
                                                 
10 Minimum capital requirements at the time of writing were RUB 90 million. In December 2011, however, 
the president signed a new law that incrementally raises the minimum capital requirements for existing banks 
to RUB 300 million (about €7.4 million) by 2015. 
11 This number has been adjusted to obtain the value comparable with the commonly used practices and does 
not correspond to officially reported numbers provided in section 2.  
12 These results are in line with the stress test results conducted by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR, 2011), 
whereby about a third of all Russian banks would need to be recapitalised under our adverse scenario. The 
CBR results are based on bank-level data as of end-2010. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Individual results of macro stress tests 
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CAR and NPL ratios for baseline scenario in 2011 
Note: CAR (%) is on the horizontal axis and NPLs 
(% of total loans) are on the vertical axis.  
CAR and NPL ratios for adverse scenario in 2011 
Note: CAR (%) is on the horizontal axis and NPLs 
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Sources: Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition and ECB calculations. 
 
 
4.2  Results by ownership 
 
One of the distinctive features of the Russian banking sector is the substantial role of the 
state. While state-controlled banks are tacitly assured of being bailed out in case of finan-
cial distress, this tells us nothing about how vulnerable these banks actually are to macro-
economic downturns. To investigate this question, we divide banks in our sample into 
three categories according to ownership. Foreign-owned banks are those where foreign 
ownership share exceeds 50%. State-controlled banks are identified based on the data from 
Vernikov (2009) updated at BOFIT. The last group consists of private domestic banks.  
Our analysis reveals that all types of banks are highly sensitive to macroeconomic 
development in the country. In line with the above-described results for the entire banking 
sector, the CAR of banks in all subgroups drops significantly in 2011 (even under the base-
line scenario). The average CAR of foreign-owned and domestic private banks drop to near 
the regulatory minimum. The situation of state-controlled banks seems a bit better as the 
starting level of CAR was higher for these banks; their average CAR does not fall below Zuzana Fungáčová and Petr Jakubík 
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15% under baseline scenario in 2011. Moreover, state-controlled banks can rely on rela-
tively stable household deposits and access to CBR financing as necessary. 
Foreign-owned banks seem most vulnerable. Almost half of foreign-owned banks 
under the baseline scenario and over half under the adverse scenario see their CARs fall 
below the regulatory minimum without infusions of fresh capital. The recapitalisation costs 
here amount to almost 0.3% of GDP under the baseline scenario, and even higher under the 
adverse scenario for 2011. Prior to the European debt crisis, at least, the working assump-
tion was that these banks have strong parent companies that would have little trouble pro-
viding additional capital infusions under normal circumstances. 
Similar recapitalisation costs as in the case of foreign-owned banks would be nec-
essary for domestic private banks. Some 30% of these banks under the baseline scenario 
and 40% in the adverse scenario would have CARs lower than the regulatory minimum 
required by Russian regulator (10%). For some of these banks, it could be challenging to 
increase their capital. Nevertheless, they can become interesting targets for acquisition by 
other banks. Russia’s state-controlled banks have grown recently by acquiring other banks, 
a trend that undoubtedly strengthens the role of state-controlled banks in all segments of 
the market. 
Under our adverse scenario, the situation worsens for foreign-owned and domestic 
private banks. The average CAR falls below the regulatory minimum for these subgroups 
of banks in 2011. 
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Results of macro stress test for ownership subgroups 
STATE-CONTROLLED BANKS  FOREIGN-OWNED BANKS 
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Sources: Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition and ECB calculations. 
Notes: Capital adequacy and non-performing loan ratios refer to the average (solid lines) and the 10
th 
and 90
th quantile (dashed lines) for the 200 largest banks by total assets. 
 
 
4.3  Results by size 
 
The fact that the Russian banking sector is so concentrated increases the relative impor-
tance of its largest banks. It is therefore prudent to analyse the results of our stress tests for 
different sized banks. We divide the banks in our sample into three categories (large, me-
dium and small) based on total assets. We apply two different sets of criteria to divide the 
banks into these subgroups,
13 but both produce the results we now describe. 
Our analysis suggests medium-sized banks are the most vulnerable. Even under 
the baseline scenario, about half of medium-sized banks end up with CARs lower than the 
regulatory minimum and the average CAR for all medium-sized banks drops below the 
minimal level. On the other hand, the average CAR of both large and small banks does not 
fall below the 10% minimum even under the adverse scenario. Large and small banks tend 
                                                 
13 The large banks are Russia’s ten largest banks by assets. Medium-sized banks are defined as either the 
eleventh to thirtieth largest banks, or alternatively, as the eleventh to fiftieth largest banks. The remaining 
banks in the Top 200 are considered as small banks. Zuzana Fungáčová and Petr Jakubík 
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to be a bit better capitalised than medium-sized banks, but their CAR declines are also not 
as sharp. Medium-sized banks are systemically important, since they are large enough to 
precipitate major bank runs. The recapitalisation costs that would be necessary for me-
dium-sized banks under adverse scenario provided that they were not able to raise new 
capital otherwise, would reach approximately 0.3% of GDP.  
Unlike medium-sized banks, small banks seem largely resilient to deterioration in 
the macroeconomic environment. A possible explanation for this phenomenon might be 
that they typically operate within a small region and focus on some specific businesses 
they know well. Such a strategy likely makes it easier to manage risk. Moreover, small 
banks on average hold substantial capital buffers. On the other hand, in comparison to 
large banks it is more difficult and more costly for medium-sized banks to acquire capital 
which makes them more vulnerable than large banks.  
 
Results of macro stress test for size subgroups 
LARGE BANKS  MEDIUM-SIZED BANKS 
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Sources: Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition and ECB calculations. 
Notes: Large banks are defined as the ten largest banks by assets, medium-sized as the eleventh to thir-
tieth largest banks and the rest are considered to be small. Capital adequacy and non-performing loan 
ratios refer to the average (solid lines) and the 10
th and 90
th quantile (dashed lines) for the 200 largest 
banks by total assets. 
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5  Conclusions 
 
A healthy financial sector is necessary for sustainable economic growth. Hence, it is cru-
cial to assess risks and potential vulnerabilities of the banking sector. Our paper proposes a 
top-down stress test methodology that employs relatively limited information. This is espe-
cially important in emerging markets where short time series, structural breaks and limited 
data availability with absence of reliable market data can make banking sector analyses 
quite challenging. Moreover, credit growth in emerging economies tends to be rather vola-
tile, especially when compared to advanced economies. This aspect of emerging econo-
mies has an important implication for choice of stress testing methodology as such volatil-
ity influences risk-weighted assets (RWA) in bank portfolios. While a commonly used 
static framework assuming constant balance sheet items over the projected horizon can be 
sufficient  for  an  advanced  economy,  it  can  substantially  bias  the  results  for  emerging 
economies where the amount of total loans can as much as double over a short period of 
time. Thus, a dynamic approach projecting key balance sheet items may better capture the 
high volatility of credit growth typical of emerging economies.  
Moreover, proper analysis of banking sector vulnerabilities is essential to address 
potential financial instability in an adequate and timely manner. Stress tests constitute an 
important part of financial stability assessment that helps regulators and policymakers re-
spond appropriately to changing macroeconomic conditions.  
Russia’s financial system is bank-based. Important sources of risk in the sector 
can be easily overlooked in aggregate banking sector numbers. Hence, we employ individ-
ual bank level data to detect possible banking sector vulnerabilities. A top-down macro 
stress test approach is applied here to assess stability of the Russian banking sector. We 
consider the 200 largest banks which constitute 94% of the banking sector’s assets. Using 
stress test framework we consistently evaluate risks on bank balance sheets (credit, market, 
contagion and income risks). Moreover, the employed dynamic approach allows us to cap-
ture impact of re/de-leveraging effect on banks’ balance sheets which is especially impor-
tant for emerging markets like Russia. We analyse the banking sector as a whole, as well as 
the resilience of subgroups based on bank size and ownership. The applied two-year hori-
zon is shown to better explicate the long-term nature of credit risk that the commonly used 
one-year horizon. Zuzana Fungáčová and Petr Jakubík 
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Our  analysis  backs  up  the  view  that  the  Russian  banking  sector  is  under-
dimensioned for the size of the economy and that the private sector is likely to face diffi-
culties in obtaining external financing when macroeconomic conditions deteriorate. We 
show that medium-sized banks are on average more vulnerable than large and small banks. 
Furthermore, the Russian banking sector remains dominated by state-controlled banks that 
are less vulnerable to global financial problems than foreign-owned banks. In any case, the 
government still has sufficient fiscal space to recapitalise the banks in a downturn. This 
was illustrated in summer 2011 with the massive public rescue of Bank of Moscow with a 
$14 billion bailout package. Serious problems of Bank of Moscow and some other banks 
which were however not spotted by the regulators point out to weaknesses in bank supervi-
sion.  
As a policy note, Russian banks in general should be expected to bolster their 
capital as economic growth recovers. Here, it is important to keep in mind that we assume 
no increase in bank capital in our calculations. In general, when considering the situation in 
pre-crisis  years,  bank  capital  was  growing  at  about  38%  on  average  in  the  period 
2001−2007. If the banking sector returns to growth, only some banks for which we have 
identified CARs below the minimum requirement would actually face this situation. Nev-
ertheless, the limited ability of the banking sector to finance the real sector could curtail 
Russian economic growth over the medium and long term.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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